Why did Nixon attribute Zhou Enlai the first credit for the breakthrough in Sino-US diplomatic relations

2020-07-31 03:10:20 0 Comment 1037 views

Marked by China's restoration of its seat in the United Nations, the thawing of Sino-US relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations betwee

Why did Nixon attribute Zhou Enlai the first credit for the breakthrough in Sino-US diplomatic relations

wen/Hu Xinmin

The first half of the 1970s was a period of breakthrough development in China’s diplomacy. Marked by China’s restoration of its seat in the United Nations, the thaw of Sino-US relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, China is veryThe goal of establishing diplomatic relations with most countries in the world has almost been achieved. The realization of this goal has enabled my country to rapidly expand exchanges with various countries in the world after reform and opening up. Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "We can embark on the four modernizations in today's international environment, and we must remember the achievements of Comrade Mao Zedong."

The emergence of this situation back then This is related to the changes in the international situation at that time, but the more important reason is that party and state leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai have far-sighted and adapted to the situation to make major adjustments to China's international strategy and foreign policy. Wu Qingtong, director of the duty office of the State Council at the time, wrote in his memoirs: "At every step of the China-US talks, Premier Zhou has to ask Mao Zedong for instructions and get Chairman Mao’s approval. The policy of the China-US talks and other major issues go through the Politburo. Discussion passed."

As ​​early as the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong wanted to do business with the West. However, the Western camp led by the United States imposed a blockade and embargo on New China, and then implemented a policy of containment against China. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, Zhou Enlai also wanted to contact the US to show goodwill, but the US strictly prohibited their people from having any contact with the Chinese delegation. Although Sino-US ambassador-level talks were later established, Sino-US relations have not been significantly improved. It was not until the second half of the 1960s that the situation began to change.

In October 1967, US President Nixon wrote in the "Diplomatic Quarterly": "From a long-term perspective, we simply cannot allow China to be permanently excluded from the international community. Outside the family... on this small earth,Can let a billion people live in anger and isolation. "This article has been translated in full in the domestic reference. Mao Zedong saw this article and paid great attention to it, so Zhou Enlai should also read it. Later, Zhou Enlai told an American reporter about this matter. Mao Zedong passed this article. The article observed that if Nixon came to power, the United States might change its policy toward China.

Sure enough, after Nixon became president in January 1969, he had cooperated with China has contacted and tried to improve its relations with China. The Chinese side has noticed these changes and is also seeking the possibility of improving relations.

October 1st and 12th, 1970 On October 18, Mao Zedong met with his American friend Snow twice. Mao Zedong told Snow that if Nixon visits "II believe I will not quarrel with Nixon. However, of course we must criticize him, and we will also make self-criticism. For example, our production level is lower than that of the United States. Mao Zedong also revealed a message to Snow: Nixon's messenger may arrive soon. "

In March 1971, during the 31st World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan, the US table tennis delegation expressed its desire to visit China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs He believed that the time was not ripe and disagreed with the reception. Zhou Enlai also agreed with the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mao Zedong also agreed with Zhou Enlai's opinion at first, but suddenly changed his mind at night and decided to invite them to visit. This is still cited as a classic in the history of diplomacy. "Ping Pong Diplomacy." Zhou Enlai commented on the request of the National Sports Commission on the reception of the US table tennis delegation on April 8: "(Inviting the US team to visit China)After going there, Nagoya circulated the news that shocked the world, surpassing the news of the 31st international competition. ”

Why did Nixon attribute Zhou Enlai the first credit for the breakthrough in Sino-US diplomatic relations

◆April 1971, Zhou Enlai received an invited interview All members of the American table tennis delegation. This invitation is called "ping pong diplomacy" in which the small ball turns the big ball.

On the afternoon of April 14, 1971, Zhou Enlai personally received all the members of the American table tennis delegation and accompanying reporters. This is Zhou Enlai's second visit to a US delegation to China after receiving a US youth delegation in 1957. The biggest difference from that time is that due to the significant improvement of China's international status, Zhou Enlai's wonderful talks when meeting with the American table tennis delegation aroused the attention of the people of the world, especially the American people. Answering the American table tennis player Cohen's talk about hippies is even more refreshing. The next day, almost all major world newspapers and news agencies reported Zhou Enlai's conversation. On April 16, Cohen’s mother passed through Hong Kong from the United States and gave a bunch of crimson roses to Zhou Enlai, thanking Zhou Enlai for speaking to his son. The "Washington Post" of the United States stated that "ping pong diplomacy" does notHowever, "China has changed its image in the American public, from storm to sunny", and it has also received a positive response from the US government.

Why did Nixon attribute Zhou Enlai the first credit for the breakthrough in Sino-US diplomatic relations

◆In 1972, Mao Zedong and Nixon held a meeting in ZhongnanhaiTalking about Zhou Enlai on the left and Kissinger on the right.

In order to receive the visit of Kissinger and subsequent Nixon from the United States, with the consent of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai personally deployed and set up a work on the United States at the end of June 1971 The leadership team, and agreed with the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Administration of Civil Aviation, will send a group of pilots and receptionists to Rawalpindi, Pakistan, to pick up Kissinger to China.

Kissinger arrived in Beijing at 12:00 on July 9 and left Beijing at 12:00 on the 11th. He stayed in Beijing for a total of 48 hours, and had 17 meetings with Zhou Enlai. Many hours. The first thing he did when he returned to Pakistan was to send a ciphered telegram "I found it" to Washington, meaning that his trip to Beijing was a success.

From the beginning of preparations for Kissinger’s visit to China to the reception of Nixon’s visit to China, China has done a lot of thoughtful and meticulous preparations. Zhou Enlai is very strict in almost every detail. It is necessary to adhere to the principles and achieve substantive results. Zhou Enlai put a lot of effort into this.

Zhou Enlai is actually the head of the reception team. Below there are several groups such as aviation, ground, negotiation, reporting, security, and bulletin. Zhou Enlai personally deployed and implemented the work of each group.

When the President of the United States visits foreign countries, he always takes his own special plane when he is in foreign countries. But this time I visited China, I was asked to take China to provideSpecial plane. Therefore, the negotiation between the aviation team and the United States was extremely difficult. Zhou Enlai said to everyone: The President of the United States has never taken a foreign plane in history. When visiting our country this time, we should respect our arrangements in our country. We have great national pride, pride and self-confidence. We are fully qualified. , Has the power to ensure the safety of the president.

The aviation team did not live up to Zhou Enlai’s expectations and everything went according to plan. When our country's special plane landed, it even achieved every second. Nixon said that the flight was good and the service was good. Hearing these two sentences, Zhou Enlai was very happy, saying that this crew was trained by ourselves, and I trust them very much. Kissinger also said that Zhou Enlai's special plane is the safest in China.

In Zhou Enlai’s affairs, I must personally, every itemThe reception activities are all proceeding step by step. But as the saying goes: plans cannot keep up with changes. In the face of changes in circumstances, Zhou Enlai was always well-informed, knowing himself and the enemy, showing a superb diplomatic art.

Before Nixon’s visit to China, he was most worried about whether Mao Zedong would receive him. He always wanted to implement this matter. However, this item was not listed in the schedule agreed by both parties. However, on the afternoon of Nixon's arrival in Beijing, Mao Zedong suddenly wanted to see Nixon, who was now preparing to take a bath. Zhou Enlai rushed to the hotel to inform Kissinger. Kissinger originally wanted to "long-winded" a few words, but "Zhou Enlai, uncharacteristically, showed impatience and said:'Since Chairman Mao invited him, he wanted to see him immediately.'" (see Kissinger: "On China") Obviously, Zhou Enlai was very aware of Nixon’s urgency to meet Mao Zedong, and also very clear about thisWhat a worldwide impact this meeting will have, so it did not take into account the usual diplomatic etiquette. At the end of this meeting, Nixon said to Mao Zedong: "We can change the world together." This sentence still affects our world today.

The other big change is that the Sino-US "Joint Communiqué" once faced a premature death.

In the four months since Kissinger’s first public visit to China in 1971 to Nixon’s visit, China and the United States have dealt with the "Joint Communiqué". The team headed by Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and the team headed by Kissinger in the United States have been engaged in arduous negotiations. There were a few times during which I could hardly talk about it. However, when Nixon visited China, the framework of the communique was finally formed. Nixon's visit to ChinaIn between, Zhou Enlai and Nixon talked twice and reached a general principle. Next, Qiao Guanhua and Kissinger formed the text of the communiqué discussed. Mao Zedong approved this text. The two sides agreed to make an announcement before Nixon ends his visit to China.

However, when Nixon and his party arrived in Hangzhou on February 26, some members of the U.S. delegation, represented by Secretary of State Rogers, disagreed with some of the bulletins. content. Nixon felt very helpless. He told the Chinese side that we are really sorry, and some questions need to be discussed again. Zhou Enlai asked Mao Zedong on the phone, and Mao Zedong said: "You can tell Nixon, except for the Taiwan part that we do not agree to amend, other parts can be discussed." So that night, China and the United States resumed negotiations. But the negotiations were very difficult, and for a while they could not go on. Qiao Guanhua proposed that we don’t want to issue a communiqué.A simple message said that the President of the United States had visited China at the invitation of the Chinese government. But the US side disagreed, saying that they could not explain it when they returned. Finally, it was not until four o'clock in the morning that the two sides reached an agreement.

Why did Nixon attribute Zhou Enlai the first credit for the breakthrough in Sino-US diplomatic relations

◆The picture shows Zhou Enlai with Nixon, Rogers, Kissin On the way to Hangzhou, Ge took Zhou Enlai’s special plane-Yi Er18. The US President’s "Air Force One" followed behind, which is rare in the history of US President’s visits.

But in fact, the main reason for Rogers's obstruction was not the content of the communique itself, but because he felt that he was responsible for US foreign affairs The Secretary of State did not receive the attention and respect he deserved during this visit to China. Not only did he not participate in the consultation communiqué, but even Mao Zedong did not have his part in the interview. Therefore, Rogers and others still expressed dissatisfaction with the revised communiqué in Hangzhou, and prepared to go to Shanghai to "make trouble" again. On the plane to Shanghai on February 27, Zhou Enlai learned of this situation. Obviously, Zhou Enlai quickly understood the crux of the problem, so he decided to visit Rogers himself immediately after arriving in Shanghai to solve this unexpected "last mile" problem.

Less than an hour after arriving in Shanghai, Zhou Enlai came to Rogers’s room. At that time, they did not expect that the Premier of China would come to visit, and the people in the room were arguing fiercely. When Zhou Enlai appeared in front of them, they all froze, and the quarrel subsided. Zhou Enlai kept quiet and said to Rogers politely, Mr. Rogers, let me see you. I'm sorry, I never came to visit you, I was too busy, so I didn't care. Rogers responded politely. So the host and guest sat down to talk. Zhou Enlai didn't mention the communiqué at all. He just praised Rogers as Secretary of State for doing a lot of work, which contributed a lot to the opening of Sino-US relations. Zhou Enlai also pointed out that the initial improvement of the relationship between the two parties started with cultural exchanges. The visits of the non-governmental exchange table tennis team played a great role. Then, Zhou EnlaiqiangTune said that cultural exchanges are so important, and exchanges between people are so important. Your State Council is a very important piece. Rogers was very happy and said this is what he should do. Then Zhou Enlai said, we should thank you for opening this door between China and the United States. First of all, you have agreed to communicate... Development efforts. In this conversation, Zhou En didn't mention the communiqué from beginning to end. But Rogers was in a good mood after the conversation, and he did not make any "opinions" to the communiqué. Zhou Enlai finally said: "I'll see you at four o'clock later." Four o'clock is the time when China and the United States agreed to release the news about the Joint Communiqué.

Zhang Hanzhi, as Zhou Enlai’s translator, participated in this visit to Rogers. She believes that the Sino-US Joint CommuniquéBeing able to publish as scheduled, Zhou Enlai's visit played a key role.

Nixon later recalled: "...The breakthrough in diplomacy was reflected in the Shanghai Communique in 1972. The first credit should go to one person, Zhou Enlai."

This article is the original article of "Gathering of Party History"

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